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Plutarque aime mieux que nous le vantions de 
son jugement que de son sçavoir; il ayme mieux 
nous laisser desir de soy que satieté 
Montaigne, Essais, I, 26 (1580) 
 
They may be as graynes of salte, that will rather 
give you an appitite, then offend you with satiety 
Bacon, Essays, “Dedicatory Epistle” (1610-1612) 
 
 
Over the last three decades, literary theory and criticism have shown an 
increasing interest in studying the cognitive and critical relevance of the 
“essay” for modern history and culture.1 I would like to supply supporting 
evidence for this perspective, examining the function of essay writing for both 
Montaigne and Francis Bacon’s conception of human thought and knowledge. 
In particular, I will focus on the epistemological implications of the essay and 
fragmentary prose, both considered forms of writing that express a particular 
way of thinking. To this end, I will rely on both authors’ statements about the 
relevance of these literary forms as modes of communication. Because of their 
philosophical significance and their biographical and literary relationships,2 
–––––––––– 
1 See for example Michael L. Hall, “The Emergence of the Essay and the Idea of 
discovery”, in Alexander J. Butrym (ed.), Essays on the Essay. Redefining the Genre (Athens 
and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1989), p. 73-91; Graham Good, The 
Observing Self: Rediscovering the Essay (London-New York: Routledge, 1988); Pierre 
Glaudes (ed.), L’Essai: métamorphoses d’un genre (Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du 
Mirail, 2002); Claire Obaldia, L’Esprit de l’essai, de Montaigne à Borges (Paris: Seuil, 2005); 
Charles Forsdick and Andy Stafford (eds.), The Modern Essay in French. Movement, 
Instability, Performance (Bern: Peter Lang, 2005); Marielle Macé, Le Temps de l’essai: histoire 
d’un genre en France au XXe siècle (Paris: Belin, 2006); Pierre Glaudes and Jean-François 
Louette, L’Essai (Paris: Armand Colin, 2011). 
2 As we know, Montaigne had an epistolary relationship with Anthony Bacon, the 
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Montaigne and Bacon allow us to understand the impact of essay writing on 
early modern human science. It should be noted that speaking of “human 
science” is not an anachronistic projection, for our authors employ analogous 
formulations in their works: Montaigne speaks of “science humaine” (II, 12, 
passim) and Bacon of “human knowledge” or “humanity” (which follows the 
knowledge of nature and God).3 Through these expressions, they refer to the 
study of human nature.  
 
* * * 
 
Let us begin by recalling the meaning of the word.4 On an etymological 
level, the French word “essai” comes from the Latin exagium-exigere, and 
originally means the weighing of, and (figuratively) an accurate examination. 
Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, these meanings retreat slightly 
in favor of others, conveying the following ideas:  test and testing (in the moral 
field), experience (in relation with methods and results), attempt, exercise, 
struggle, etc.5 This semantic range is at the origin of the English terminology, 
where the word “assay” (from the Anglo-French “assai”), appearing in the 
fourteenth century, is commonly substituted by “essay” (from Middle French 
–––––––––– 
brother of Francis, to whom is dedicated the first edition of the Essays (1597). On this 
relationship, corroborated by a letter of Pierre de Brach to Anthony Bacon (October 
10, 1592), see Pierre Villey, Montaigne et François Bacon (Paris: Revue de la Renaissance, 
1913), p. 10-13; Warren Boutcher, “Montaigne et Anthony Bacon: la familia et la 
fonction des lettres”, Montaigne Studies, vol. XIII, 2001, p. 241-276. On the crucial 
importance of Early Modern French philosophy and culture for Bacon, see Marta 
Fattori, “Francis Bacon et la culture française”, in Élodie Cassan (ed.), Bacon et Descartes. 
Genèse de la modernité philosophique (Lyon: ENS Éditions, 2014), p. 25-47 (on Montaigne, 
p. 38-40). Butcher and Fattori suggest that Bacon read the Essais in their original 
language and not in the John Florio’s translation.   
3 Our quotations of Montaigne are from Les Essais (ed. by Pierre Villey, Paris: 
PUF/Quadrige, 2004). Our quotations of Bacon’s works are from Francis Bacon. The 
Major Works (ed. by Brian Vickers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): on this 
point, see The Advancement of Learning, II, p. 215, 205 and passim. 
4 I am not trying to develop a typological theory of the essay, or to draw a genealogy 
of the essay from its historical premises. There is a huge critical literature in Europe 
and United States on this topic. Nevertheless, my analysis could cast some new light on 
these issues. 
5 See the classic article of Andreas Blinkenberg, “Quel sens Montaigne a-t-il voulu 
donner au mot Essais dans le titre de son œuvre?”, Bulletin de la Société des Amis de 
Montaigne, n° 29, 1964, p. 22-32, in which he gives a concise and useful analysis of the 
semantics spectrum of this term at the time of Montaigne, based on the Renaissance 
dictionaries (Robert Estienne and Jean Nicot) and the statements of contemporary 
writers (Lipsius, La Croix du Maine, Pasquier, etc.). See also the entry “Essai” in 
Philippe Desan (ed.), Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne (Paris: H. Champion, 2007). For 
the relationships between the Essais and the short narrative tale of the sixteenth-century 
see Deborah Losse, Montaigne and Brief Narrative Form. Shaping the Essay (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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“essai”) in the seventeenth century, when it comes to be understood as a trial, 
attempt, endeavor, tasting, first draft, etc.6 From these several meanings arise 
some features that will become common markers of the essay writing of 
Montaigne and Bacon: the idea of a dynamic and transitive7 activity, a rela-
tionship to experience and training, and the notion of an incomplete and 
unsettled process.  
In Montaigne’s Essais, both the word “essai” and the verb “[s’]essayer” 
indicate a way of thinking and writing, a reflexive and a discursive practice. As 
Hugo Friedrich writes, “le style de l’essai, chez Montaigne, est pour ainsi dire 
antérieur à la rédaction elle-même, il a son point de départ dans le processus 
de pensée”8. This does not mean that Montaigne’s literary practice proceeds 
from a preconceived thought, but that the essay’s form embodies and ex-
presses a specific conception of thinking and knowing. What is this conception, 
and in what sense does it mark the start of the “essai”? 
Among the several meanings of the words “essai” and “essayer”, Montaigne 
seems to favor the one designating a reflective and critical activity, the exercise 
of his “facultés naturelles”. In “De l’institution des enfans” we read:  
 
Quant aux facultez naturelles qui sont en moy, dequoy c’est icy l’essay, je les sens 
flechir sous la charge. Mes conceptions et mon jugement ne marche qu’à 
tastons, chancelant, bronchant et chopant; et, quand je suis allé le plus avant 
que je puis, si ne me suis-je aucunement satisfaict: je voy encore du païs au 
delà, mais d’une veue trouble et en nuage, que je ne puis desmeler” (I, 26, 
146, emphasis mine).  
 
Montaigne’s book, titled Essais, is described here as the testing and the exam-
ination of natural cognitive capabilities, that is to say his “judgment” and its 
–––––––––– 
6 See Gli “Essayes” di Francis Bacon. Studio introduttivo, testo critico e commento, ed. by 
Mario Melchionda (Florence: Olschki Editore, 1979), p. 10-12. 
7 Transitivity—the fact that essay writing and thinking are always related to 
temporal and historical experiences and objects—is a crucial feature of the essay, in 
contrast with the tendency of transcending the factual to attain pure intelligibility and 
metaphysical foundations, which is an important part of modern philosophy. As 
Theodor Adorno wrote: “the essay is not intimidated by the depraved profundity 
which claims that truth and history are incompatible. If truth has in fact a temporal 
core, then the full historical content becomes an integral moment in truth; the a 
posteriori becomes concretely the a priori” (Theodor W. Adorno, “The Essay as Form”, 
New German Critique, n° 32 (Spring-Summer), 1984, p. 151-171, here p. 158). La Croix 
du Maine (Bibliothèque Françoise, 1584) stressed the transitive nature of Montaigne’s 
Essais defining it as “experiences, c’est-à-dire discours pour se façonnner sur autrui” (Les 
Bibliothèques Françoises de La Croix du Maine et de Du Verdier (Paris: Saillant et Nyon, 1772, 
II, p. 130, emphasis mine). Bacon’s philosophy shares this same conception of the 
historical and factual grounds of thought—on this point, see Guido Giglioni, Francesco 
Bacone (Rome: Carocci, 2011), p. 34-35, 46-47. 
8 Hugo Friedrich, Montaigne, ed. Philippe Desan, trans. Dawn Eng (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991), p. 346. See also Terence Cave: “[Montaigne] 
uses the word essay […] to describe the nature of his thinking and his writing (the two 
simultaneously)” (How to Read Montaigne [London: Granta Books, 2007], p. 20-21). 
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products, the “conceptions”. The adjective “natural” must be understood in 
light of what Montaigne writes at the beginning of chapter I, 26 about his 
education and his superficial acquaintance with academic disciplines such as 
Medicine, Law and Mathematics. Speaking of his “natural” capabilities, 
Montaigne stresses their innate character (in-natus, born with him) as opposed 
to what is acquired through learning,9 i.e. “la doctrine”, that Montaigne strongly 
critiques in his work.10 He opposes the training and testing of judgment 
inherent to the essay to the knowledge, exercising memory, whose source is 
outside of us, that is typical of the doctrine: “Ce n’est pas ici ma doctrine, c’est 
mon estude; et n’est pas la leçon d’autruy, c’est la mienne. Et ne me doibt on 
sçavoir mauvais gré pour tant, si je la communique. Ce qui me sert, peut aussi 
par accident servir à un autre” (II, 6, 378). 
The intellectual activity tested by Montaigne in his book is nonetheless 
characterized by some essential features: it is unpredictable and uncertain, 
resulting in occasional progress in the order of ideas or “conceptions” that lead 
to new, unfamiliar regions of thought to explore. In a famous passage of 
chapter I, 50, “De Democritus et Heraclitus”, Montaigne describes this 
reflexive activity—called “essai”—through a vocabulary that also draws 
attention to some other epistemological features.  
 
Le jugement est un util à tous subjects, et se mesle par tout. A cette cause, aux 
essais que j’en fay ici, j’y employe toute sorte d’occasion. Si c’est un subject que 
je n’entende point, à cela mesme je l’essaye, sondant le gué de bien loing; et 
puis, le trouvant trop profond pour ma taille, je me tiens à la rive: et cette 
reconnoissance de ne pouvoir passer outre, c’est un traict de son effect, voire 
de ceux dequoy il se vante le plus. Tantost, à un subject vain et de neant, 
j’essaye voir s’il trouvera dequoy lui donner corps, et dequoy l’appuyer et 
estançonner. Tantost je le promene à un subject noble et tracassé, auquel il 
n’a rien à trouver de soy, le chemin en estant si frayé qu’il ne peut marcher 
que sur la piste d’autruy. Là il fait son jeu à eslire la route qui luy semble la 
meilleure, et, de mille sentiers, il dict que cettuy-cy, ou celuy là, a esté le 
mieux choisi. Je prends de la fortune le premier argument. Ils me sont 
également bons. Et ne desseigne jamais de les produire entiers. Car je ne voy 
le tout de rien: Ne font pas, ceux qui promettent de nous le faire veoir” (I, 50, 
301-302, emphasis mine). 
 
As this passage shows, the essay of the “facultez naturelles” and of the 
“judgment” share the same purpose. They demonstrate reflexivity: a thought-
ful reflection on objects or problems of experience that involves, at the same 
–––––––––– 
9 See also chapter II, 10, “Des livres”: “C’est icy purement l’essay de mes facultez 
naturelles, et nullement des acquises; et qui me surprendra d’ignorance, il ne fera rien 
contre moy, car à peine respondroy-je à autruy de mes discours, qui ne m’en responds 
point à moy; ny n’en suis satisfaict. Qui sera en cherche de science, si la pesche où elle 
se loge: il n’est rien dequoy je face moins de profession” (II, 10, 407).  
10 On this point, see Thierry Gontier: “Doctrine et science dans les Essais de 
Montaigne”, in Philippe Büttgen and Ruedi Imbach (eds.), Vera Doctrina. L’idée de doctrine 
d’Augustin à Descartes (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz in Kommission, 2009), p. 343-364. 
Essay Writing and Human Science in Montaigne and Bacon 217 
time, a reflection on his own thinking, notably its powers and limits. 
Montaigne also specifies that the work of judgment leads to fragmentary 
productions,11 along a more analytic than synthetic or synoptic approach—“je 
ne voy le tout de rien” is the contrary of the Greek word “συνοπτικος” 
(synopticos), i.e. “who can see the whole in a glance.” These epistemological 
features of the essay result in a conception of the writer not as a “cathedrant” 
(who speaks ex cathedra) producing a fixed and authoritative knowledge, but as 
an “apprenti” (novice) whose soul “est tousjours en apprentissage et en 
espreuve” (III, 2, 805),12 and which “propose des fantasies informes et 
irresolues […] non pour establir la verité mais pour la chercher” (I, 56, 317).13 
It is a typical feature of Montaigne’s work to link this cognitive conception 
of the essay to a “theory” of the literary form that expresses it. As a mode of 
thought, the essay shapes its discursive mode of communication in an open, 
moving, and discontinuous fashion. In a well-known article, Theodor Adorno 
points out that the essay “draws the fullest consequences from the critique of 
the system”: its form is “fragmentary and random”, and does not suppose the 
“giveness of totality.”14 The essay does not subordinate concepts in a 
methodical construction but coordinates them following side paths, “methodi-
cally unmethodically.”15 Claiming intellectual modesty, the Montaignian essay 
practices an “oblique” logic of thought in contrast with a rational linearity.16 
This lack of conceptual unity shows Montaigne’s personal and creative 
transformation of traditional rhetorical procedures such as dispositio, compositio 
–––––––––– 
11 “Je prononce ma sentence par articles descousus, ainsi que de chose qui ne se peut 
dire à la fois et en bloc” (III, 13, 1076).   
12 See II, 3, 350: “Car c’est aux apprentifs à enquerir et à debatre, et au cathedrant 
de resoudre.” 
13 See also I, 56, 323.  
14 Theodor W. Adorno, art. cit., p. 157, 159. We can also think of Montaigne: “Qui 
ne voit que j’ay pris une route par laquelle, sans cesse et sans travail, j’iray autant qu’il 
y aura d’ancre et de papier au monde?” (III, 9, 945); “Joint qu’à l’adventure ay-je 
quelque obligation particuliere à ne dire qu’à demy, à dire confusément, à dire 
discordamment” (III, 9, 995-996). 
15 Theodor W. Adorno, art. cit., p. 161. 
16 “Je m’esgare, mais plustot par licence que par mesgarde. Mes fantasies se suyvent, 
mais par fois c’est de loing, et se regardent, mais d’une veue oblique” (III, 9, 994). 
According to Adorno, the essay’s form has an anti-Cartesian nature: “On the whole it 
could be interpreted as a protest against the four rules that Descartes’ Discourse on 
Method sets up at the beginning of modern Western science and its theory” (Theodor 
W. Adorno, art. cit., p. 161). This is a valid point, but it is also worth noting that 
Descartes’s Discours de la méthode (1637) was conceived as an introduction to three 
“essais” (La Dioptrique, Les Météores et La Géométrie) and supposed to show the method at 
work. Descartes represents another tradition of (essay) writing, involving a conception 
of thinking and knowledge very different from that of Montaigne and Bacon; for a 
survey of this topic, see Jean Lafond, “Discours et essai, ou de l’écriture philosophique 
de Montaigne à Descartes”, in Giulia Belgioioso et al. (ed.), Descartes: il metodo e i Saggi 
(Florence: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1990), p. 63-75.  
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and syllogism;17 it does not imply a lack of thematic and intellectual unity. In 
other words, unity is open, not given as an a priori feature of the text resulting 
from defined rules of composition. The essay’s form, with its logic of fragments 
and sequences, its paratactic style, and juxtaposition of phrases and quota-
tions18, requires the active interpretative work of the reader, perhaps more 
than any other form of philosophical prose. 
This valorization of the fragment and the short form expresses the crucial 
commitment of the Montaignian essay to preserve its essential quality: the 
freedom of judgment and enquiry that Sextus Empiricus called the “zetetic” 
but which Montaigne, reader of the Latin translation of the Outlines of Pyrrho-
nism, knew as the expression “institutio quaesitoria,” the way and the method of 
research.19 When we read that “Nous sommes nais à quester la verité” (III, 8, 
928) and “le monde n’est qu’une escole d’inquisition” (ibid.), we realize that 
the essay translates a philosophy of research and investigation, which its open 
and shattered form most suitably transcribes. In contrast to the “parler 
dogmatiste et resolutif” (II, 12, 509), which expresses itself in a conclusive 
manner, the essay is a provisional and incomplete work always calling for 
subsequent reflections by the author and the reader. In that perspective, we 
may appreciate the scientific value of the essay’s form, insofar as it is inspiring 
and productive, and promotes the development of ideas and the advancement 
of research. 
The discursive regime of the essay has an incentive as well as a performa-
tive function, inviting the reader to participate actively in the development of 
mutual thinking, and to exercise a critical evaluation, while constantly 
renewing how statements are interpreted. This creative reading is embodied 
by the “suffisant lecteur”, the one who, rather than waiting passively for ready-
made meanings, contributes to the search and production of meaning by an 
active understanding, providing the text with more than the text offers: “Un 
suffisant lecteur descouvre souvant és escrits d’autruy des perfections autres 
que celles que l’autheur y a mises et apperceues, et y preste des sens et des 
visages plus riches” (I, 26, 127). Finally, it is worth noting that the literary style 
of the essay also educates the mind and the passions of the reader in a very 
dynamic way, consistent with the philosophy of investigation I have shown 
above. By their incomplete and changing character, the Essais do not satisfy 
the reader’s need for easy and immediate understanding, thus preserving his 
–––––––––– 
17 See Jean Lafond, “Achèvement/inachèvement dans les Essais”, in Claude Blum 
(ed.), Montaigne et les Essais 1588-1988 (Paris: H. Champion, 1990), p. 175-185.  
18 On parataxis, see III, 9, 995. As Peter Mack has shown, this logic owes much to 
the Rhetorical education of Montaigne, based on the grammar-school copia techniques 
of listing qualities, generating contraries and comparisons in developing and expressing 
ideas: Peter Mack, Reading and Rhetoric in Montaigne and Shakespeare (London and New 
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), in particular chapter 3, p. 42-73. For Terence 
Cave, this logic deserves a “cognitive” project, that is the construction of a critical and 
pragmatic thinking in the writer and the reader (Terence Cave, op. cit., p. 4-5). 
19 Sexti philosophi Pyrrhoniarum hypotyposeon libri III (latin translation by Henri Estienne, 
Genève, 1562), I, III, p. 10. 
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or her desire to move forward and to think further. The literary model that 
inspires Montaigne in this case is Plutarch’s Œuvres morales. As he wrote: 
“Plutarque aime mieux que nous le vantions de son jugement que de son 
sçavoir; il ayme mieux nous laisser desir de soy que satieté. Il sçavoit qu’és 
choses bonnes mesmes on peut trop dire” (I, 26, 157). “Ne dire qu’à demy”, as 
Montaigne writes, is the best way of preserving a reader’s desire to go further 
in thought.  
Let us now turn our attention to Francis Bacon, the English philosopher 
and politician who, in 1597, published a small book entitled Essays (with 10 
chapters). He kept working on this book throughout his entire life by rewriting 
and transforming its content and form, thereby giving two increased editions: 
one in 1612 (composed of 38 chapters), and the other in 1625 (composed of 58 
chapters) which is considered the final text.20 If critics usually stress the 
commonality of the Baconian rewriting process and Montaigne’s revisions of 
the Essais, I believe they have undervalued other, more important similarities 
between them, notably in what concerns their anthropological and moral 
thought, as well as the care they took in defining the epistemological value of 
essay writing21. 
Considering the dedicatory epistles of the first two editions of the Essays, 
we may note some passages dealing with form and style, which have relevant 
literary and philosophical implications. In “The Epistle Dedicatorie” of the 
1597 edition, addressed to his brother Antony, Bacon expresses the partial and 
unsystematic character of the Essays defining them as “fragments of my 
conceits [i.e. conceptions]” (Essays, 545). In “The Epistle Dedicatorie” to the 
Prince Henry Stuart—written for the 1612 edition but finally removed 
probably because of the death of the Prince—Bacon delimits the nature of the 
Essays as follow:  
 
certain brief notes, sett down rather significantly than curiously, which I have 
called Essays. The word is late, but the thing is ancient, for Seneca’s Epistles to 
Lucilius, if one marks them well, are but Essays, that is, dispersed Meditations, 
though conveyed in the form of Epistles. […] my hope is, they may be as 
grains of salt, that will rather give you an appetite than offend you with 
satiety. […] I have endeavored to make them not vulgar, but of a nature 
whereof a man shall find much in experience, and little in books (Essays, 677-
678).  
–––––––––– 
20 For a presentation of the editorial history of the Essays from 1597 to 1625, see the 
critical edition of Mario Melchionda, op. cit., p. 3-56. This is a valuable edition of the 
Essays (London, 1625), with useful commentaries (“Schede di lettura”) on each essay, 
and, generally, a mine of information.  
21 I do not deal here with the debated question of the “influence” of Montaigne’s 
Essais on Bacon’s Essays—in my opinion, there is much strong evidence suggesting that 
this influence exist, and this article can be considered as a contribution towards this 
view. For the denial and depreciation of this influence, see the classic and misleading 
article of Jacob Zeitlin, “The development of Bacon’s Essays, with special reference to 
the question of Montaigne’s influence upon them”, Journal of English and Germanic 
Philology, vol. XXVII, 1928, p. 496-519. 
220 Emiliano Ferrari 
  
The Essays are here described as brief notes, more concerned with subject-
matter and meaning than style and form,22 closer to men’s experiences than to 
the doctrine of books, and whose purpose it is to stimulate the reader’s 
appetite for knowledge rather than satisfying it. 
These passages about the discursive and reflexive status of the Essays take 
on their full significance in light of the reflections of The Advancement of 
Learning,23 devoted to the most suitable ways for “expressing or transferring our 
knowledge to the other” (230). Bacon calls this survey “Tradition” or 
“Delivery” (i.e. transmission), and considers it as a sub-section of the “Human 
Knowledge which concerns the Mind” (Adv., II, 215).24 “Tradition” corre-
sponds to the rhetoric operations of dispositio and elocutio, dealing with the 
arranging and the communication of the found material with the invention.25 
 The “Method of Tradition” has two parts: the one relates to the “use of 
knowledge” without increasing it (named “magistral”); the other relates to the 
–––––––––– 
22 This commitment to weight and matter (res) rather than to form and phrase (verba) 
is consistent with the Baconian analysis of the “errors and vanities” which, intervened 
in the studies, discredit learning and block its advance (Adv., I, p. 137). The rhetorical 
affectation and Ciceronian imitation are criticized as “the first distemper [i.e. disorder, 
disease] of learning, when men study words and not matter” (Adv., I, p. 139). This 
attitude has strong affinities with the Montaignian denunciation of pedantry (see 
chapters I, 25, “Du pedantisme” and I, 26, “De l’institution des enfans”) and, in 
general, with his contempt for verbal subtleties and vain imitation: “Je veux que les 
choses surmontent, et qu’elles remplissent de façon l’imagination de celuy qui escoute, 
qu’il n’aye aucune souvenance des mots. […] L’imitation du parler, par sa facilité, suit 
incontinent tout un peuple; l’imitation du juger, de l’inventer ne va pas si vite” (I, 26, 
171-172). When in The Advancement Bacon let see his preference for “weight of the 
matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of invention, or depth of 
judgment” (Adv., I, p. 139), his position shows important affinity with that of 
Montaigne. On Bacon and rhetoric, see the fundamental works of Brian Vickers, 
Francis Bacon and the Renaissance Prose (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); 
“Bacon and the rhetoric”, in Markku Peltonen, The Cambridge Companion to Bacon 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 200-231 (on the distinction 
between res and verba, see p. 222-227). For the relation between rhetorical tradition and 
the method of science, see Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon. From magic to science [1957] 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), chap. VI. 
23 Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Humane (1605) is followed by 
an expanded and Latinized version published in 1623 entitled De Dignitate et Augmentis 
Scientiarum Libri IX. Our quotations of the De Augmentis are from James Spedding et al. 
(eds.), The Works of Francis Bacon (New York: Hurd and Houghton, 1864, vol. II), book 
VI, chap. 2—for the English translation see volume IX. 
24 It may be recalled that the Baconian partitio of the “Human Philosophy” studying 
the intellectual operations of the mind has four stages: the art of inquiry or invention; 
the art of examination or judgment; the art of custody or memory; and the art of 
elocution or tradition (Adv., II, p. 215-243). This roughly corresponds to the rhetorical 
operations of inventio, dispositio, elocutio, pronuntiatio, and memoria (see Peter Mack, A History 
of Renaissance Rhetoric: 1380-1620 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011], p. 305). 
25 See Sachiko Kusukawa, “Bacon’s classification of knowledge”, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Bacon, op. cit., p. 47-74, here p. 64. 
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“progression of knowledge” and seeks to promote further investigations 
(named “of probation”). According to Bacon, if the former is widely practiced 
by the scientific community, the latter is abandoned because of a “contract of 
error between the deliverer and the receiver” of knowledge, based, as a last 
resort, on the quality of their passion for learning:  
 
He that delivereth knowledge desireth to deliver it in such form as may be 
best believed, and not as may be best examined; and he that receiveth 
knowledge desireth rather present satisfaction than expectant inquiry; and so 
rather not to doubt than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open 
his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength (Adv., II, 
233). 
  
Wishing to be believed, the “deliverer” communicates knowledge in the most 
persuasive possible form, without stimulating further examination. Desiring 
immediate gratification over the search for knowledge, the “receiver” prefers 
to be deceived rather than to doubt. Concerned for his “glory”, the master 
hides his weaknesses; hindered by his “sloth”, the disciple cannot test his 
cognitive strengths. 
As Montaigne,26 Bacon criticizes traditional teaching methods for the 
dogmatic and authoritative approaches that prevent the student from 
evaluating and judging the materials presented, and comfort him in uncritical 
learning. One could say that Bacon’s method of “probation” is similar to the 
Montaignian want of presenting his thoughts “comme les enfans proposent 
leurs essais: instruisables, non instruisants” (I, 56, 323), that is to say in a way 
which is “enquesteuse, non resolutive” (III, 11, 1030), and “non pour establir 
la vérité, mais pour la chercher” (I, 56, 317). This way of writing, calling for 
further work in the search of truth, evokes the Baconian image of the “filios 
scientiarum” (Adv., II, 233), “the sons of sciences” who will grow and improve 
knowledge in the future, and to whom the method “of probation” is 
addressed.27  
According to Bacon, there is a form of writing that is very useful for the 
progress of knowledge and avoids the damages of the “Magistral” method. He 
calls it “writing in Aphorisms”, as opposed to the “writing in Method” that is 
the coherent and systematic exposition of knowledge (Adv., II, 234), or its 
“over-early and peremptory reduction […] into arts and methods” (Adv., I, 
145-146). Against this “unhealthy tendency”28 of producing premature and 
authoritative knowledge, Bacon prescribes aphoristic writing and fragmentary 
discourse, because “knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations, it is 
in growth” (Adv., I, 146, emphasis mine). The Book II of the Advancement 
–––––––––– 
26 For a survey of the pedagogical ideas of Montaigne, see my chapter in Joy 
A. Palmer Cooper (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Educational Thinkers (Oxon/New 
York: Routledge, 2016, in press). 
27 See also De Augmentis, VI, 2, p. 429 and the precisions of Spedding in note 1. 
28 The expression is from Brian Vickers, Francis Bacon. The Major Works, op. cit.,         
p. 598. 
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contains a notable and coherent theory of the aphorism, showing Bacon’s 
awareness of the epistemological significance of the literary form in communi-
cating knowledge.29 In sum, it could be said that, among its “many excellent 
virtues” (Adv., II, 234), aphoristic writing stands out mainly for its unsystematic 
character, which allows the expression of observations and conceptions 
without locking them into a closed construction. Flexible and changing, this 
form of writing stays close to ordinary experience and accommodates those 
subjects who are “the most immersed” in the “particulars” and “in multi-
formity of matter” (ibid., 235), namely the individual and social behaviors 
studied by moral and political philosophy.30 Moreover, aphorism and frag-
mentary prose have an elevated cognitive potential and a strong “attractive 
power”31: “Aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to 
inquire further; whereas Methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, 
as if they were at furthest” (Adv., II, p. 235). For all these reasons, aphoristic 
writing characterizes a large portion of Bacon’s works, from the Maxims of the 
Law (1597) to natural science (Novum Organum, Historia Naturalis et Experimentalis), 
achieving its fuller application in the psychological, moral and political 
investigations of the Essays. As “fragment of [...] conceits” and “dispersed 
meditations,” Bacon’s Essays fulfill his ideal of a fruitful communication of 
knowledge and contribute mainly to his science of man.32 
 
* * * 
 
On the basis of these analyses, we can see that Montaigne’s and Bacon’s 
reflections on essay writing and aphorism share some essential features. First, 
they are both aware of the need to communicate thought and knowledge in a 
particular way to provoke examination and further thought in the reader. To 
this end, they refute authoritative modes of communication, promoting the 
attitude of a “beginner’s mind” in thinking and learning—in such forms as 
Montaigne’s “apprentifs” and Bacon’s “filios scientiae”.33 In this respect, I would 
–––––––––– 
29 As Brian Vickers writes (Francis Bacon and the Renaissance Prose, op. cit., p. 60-61), 
aphorism is “the genre which provoked Bacon’s richest theoretical discussion of form 
(indeed, one might say that this was his only adequate discussion of a literary form)”.  
30 Aphoristic form is the best suited to represent the contingent and circumstantial 
character of everyday life: “particulars, being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed 
directions” (Adv., II, p. 235; see also p. 265). The De Augmentis is more explicit: “Quia vero 
actiones in vita communi sparguntur, non ordine componuntur, ideo magis iisdem conducunt etiam 
sparsa documenta” (VI, 2, p. 431). 
31 See Brian Vickers, Francis Bacon and the Renaissance Prose, op. cit., p. 72. 
32 On this point I follow Ronald S. Crane, “The Relation of Bacon’s Essays to His 
Program for the Advancement of Learning”, in B. Vickers (ed.), Essential Articles for the 
Study of Francis Bacon (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972), p. 272-292). Crane shows 
how the Essays (especially in the 1612 and 1625 editions) take a central role in the 
science of moral, social, and political life outlined in the Advancement and De Augmentis. 
33 As Montaigne refutes the “parler dogmatiste et resolutif” (II, 12, 510), Bacon 
critiques the “magistral and peremptory” ways of transmitting knowledge (Adv., I,       
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argue that Bacon’s theory of aphorism and fragmentary prose draws on 
Montaigne’s view of the essay’s form as the most suited to inspire new 
thoughts and experiences for the reader. Bacon builds his theory of the 
cognitive power of the aphorism and, in general, of the fragmentary style, 
modeling and adapting to his scientific design the main arguments and ideas 
developed by Montaigne.34 Second, for both authors, the literary forms 
considered embody a mode of thinking that channels open, critical and 
experimental conceptions of knowledge, altogether avoiding models of 
systematic exposition and fixed process. This conception has implications for 
the epistemological status of their science of man, which is unsystematic and 
dispersed, and represents the discrete, moving and contradictory character of 
human experience. This last point is important because it represents the 
foundation of a tradition in philosophical anthropology at the dawn of the 
early modern period, which provided an alternative to the rising “systematic” 
philosophies of man, such as those of Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza.35 
For all of these reasons, I believe that the literary relationships between 
the Essais and the Essays require further investigation: they are not only 
essential for understanding the constitution of Bacon’s moral and political 
anthropology,36 but also for appreciating the complex emergence of the early 
modern philosophy of man, which also requires further study.37 
 
Université Jean Moulin Lyon III 
–––––––––– 
p. 147). It is worth noting that both authors have in mind the authoritative mode of 
expression of the law, which is conclusive and irrefutable.  
34 According to Brian Vickers, “this concept of the attractive power of the aphorism 
in stimulating further thought seems to be quite original to Bacon” (Francis Bacon and 
Renaissance Prose, op. cit., p. 71-72). Vickers draws this conclusion showing the novelty of 
the Baconian use and meaning of aphorism compared to the several Renaissance 
traditions of aphorism (see p. 60-72); and for the scope of his study, I think he is right. 
But if we consider other literary practices, and more particularly Montaigne’s Essais, 
things do change. For the reasons exposed in this article, I am inclined to believe that 
Bacon’s “originality” is inspired by Montaigne’s views on essay writing and practice. 
35 I write “systematic” with quotation marks because these philosophies obviously 
have their incoherencies and blind spots. Nevertheless, they share a predilection for 
methodically ordered expositions that influences and marks their way of thinking and 
writing more or less strongly. 
36 This inquiry is part of a wider research project on Montaigne’s relevance for the 
rise of early modern philosophies of man: see Emiliano Ferrari, Montaigne: une anthropo-
logie des passions (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2014); Id. and Thierry Gontier (ed.), L’Axe 
Montaigne-Hobbes: anthropologie et politique (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2016). 
37 This article is an abridged version of a paper delivered at an international 
conference on “O livro científico no Renascimento” (Universidade Federal Flumi-
nense, Rio de Janeiro, September 29-30, 2014). I would like to thank the organizer, 
Celso Martins Azar Filho, for his kind invitation and hospitality. I would also like to 
express my gratitude to Kendra Walker for her reading and comments.  
